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ABSTRACT 
In the near future our combat units will evolve into an integrated military 
force through the utilization of weapon systems that employ digital electronics to 
acquire, exchange, and employ timely digital information throughout the 
battlespace. This thesis justifies the need for an on-board digital tactical data 
system for Marine Corps armored vehicles with the presentation of potential 
digitization benefits and simulation analysis results. Unique operational 
requirements for a vehicular combat information system are presented with specific 
functional and physical descriptions and life cycle cost estimates for two candidate 
systems. These systems are analyzed and compared using a fixed effectiveness 
approach to cost benefit analysis. Conclusions and recommendations for the 
Marine Corps" evolution to battalion and below battlefield digitization are included. 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The United States Marine Corps is currently developing 
the strategy and evaluating the technology to implement 
battlefield digitization concepts. As defined by the 
Digitization of the Battlefield (DotB) Working Group 
established by the Director, Command, Control, Computers, 
Intelligence, and Interoperability (C4I2), "Digitization of 
the Battlefield is the application of Information Technologies 
to acquire, exchange, and employ timely digital information 
throughout the battlespace." This definition, driven by 
continuing information technology advances, forms the basis 
for specific operational requirements generation and system 
development. 
Funding the Marine Corps' digitization effort is the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with Program Budget 
Decision 105 (PBD-105). "PBD-105 provided $411 million to the 
U. S. Army research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 
authorization during FY 95-99 for equipping Army and Marine 
Corps armored vehicles with a digital communications overlay 
system to include: a situational display, Global Positioning 
System (GPS) compatibility, and message interface using 
SINCGARS radios." (DotB, 1994) $40 million of this amount was 
redistributed to Procurement Marine corps (PMC) funds to 
ensure that a focus would be maintained on the procurement of 
a system for Marine Corps vehicles. 
As the Marine Corps forges ahead in the effort to 
digitize battalion and below units, a number of candidate 
tactical data systems (TDS) which possess comparable 
attributes will present themselves. The presence of more than 
one technology source, coupled with the reality of a limited 
budget, necessitates a careful analysis of system 
alternatives.  A common and very useful analytical method is 
to perform a cost and operational effectiveness analysis on 
candidate systems to determine which is the more appealing 
from an economic and performance enhancing viewpoint. 
This thesis will analyze and compare two tactical data 
systems: 1) the Tactical Combat Operations, Armored Vehicle 
Variant (TCO Armor) and 2) the Multi-Application Command and 
Control Kit (MACCK). 
The TCO Armor is being developed by a team at Naval 
Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center In-Service 
Engineering (NISE) East Coast division in conjunction with the 
Marine Corps' TCO program office. It is intended to be a 
fully compatible derivative of the TCO, the Marine Corps' 
automated command and control system. The TCO Armor will use 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, coupled with a 
modified version of TCO software tailored for units below the 
battalion level. Individual systems will act as part of a 
fully distributed and integrated digital combat information 
system. 
The MACCK is a command, control, communication, and 
intelligence (C3I) system "which prepares, collects, 
organizes, displays and disseminates pertinent battlefield C3I 
information to task force assets at the battalion echelon and 
below." (SA-MACCK-0 00 01) Developed and produced by General 
Dynamics Land Systems Inc., the MACCK is an applique system 
built to militarized standards. It is being developed to fill 
the immediate Army digitization needs of the Brigade '96 
program. This is an ambitious endeavor in which the Army 
intends to digitize a brigade size unit by 1996. Although 
targeted for compatibility with existing Army systems, the 
MACCK is a viable option for a system to fulfill Marine Corps 
digitization goals. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The objectives of this study are to: 1) evaluate the need 
for an on-board digital tactical data system for Marine Corps 
armored vehicles and 2) identify which of the two candidate 
systems analyzed in this thesis can meet this need in the more 
cost-effective manner. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Which, the TCO or the MACCK, is the most cost-effective 
system to procure for use on Marine Corps armored vehicles? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What are the benefits of battlefield digitization at 
the battalion and below level? 
b. What are the core requirements for an on-board 
digital tactical data system? 
c. What are the functional capabilities of the TCO and 
the MACCK? 
d. "What is the life-cycle cost estimate for the TCO and 
the MACCK? 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The analysis and presentation of current literature will 
be the means by which to justify the need for the procurement 
by the Marine Corps of a digital tactical data system for its 
armored vehicles. The fixed-effectiveness approach to 
cost/benefit analysis will be the methodology employed to meet 
the research objective of determining the most cost-effective 
system to meet this need. This approach identifies fixed 
performance parameters that each system is measured against. 
Utilizing life-cycle cost estimates as a measure of economic 
cost, the system with the lowest cost which most closely meets 
ail performance parameters is determined to be the more cost- 
effective system. 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The thrust of this study is two-fold. First, it intends 
to justify the need for the digitization of echelons below 
battalion in the Marine Corps. Next, it intends to provide 
the information and framework on which a decision maker can 
make an intelligent assessment of the two candidate systems. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II identifies the benefits of digitized command 
and control and provides simulation data to justify the Marine 
Corps' pursuance of this concept. Chapter III discusses 
cost/benefit comparison techniques and emphasizes their 
importance in the weapon system procurement decision making 
process. Chapter IV provides the tactical data system core 
requirements which each system will be measured against. 
Chapter V provides a detailed physical and functional 
description of each system while Chapter VI presents their 
life cycle cost estimates. Chapter VII will conclude the 
thesis by discussing how well each system meets the pre- 
defined requirements while taking into account their 
respective life cycle cost estimates. Further, it will 
propose recommendations for the future direction of the Marine 
Corps Digitization of the Battlefield program. 
II.  BATTLEFIELD DIGITIZATION 
A.  BENEFITS 
Four years ago, during Operation Desert Storm, many 
information opportunities made available by advances in 
digital technology were yet to be seized upon. Battalion and 
below level commanders depended almost entirely upon voice and 
visual communications to control their units and maintain 
situational awareness on the battlefield. In the near future 
our combat units will evolve into an integrated digital 
military force through the utilization of weapon systems that 
employ digital electronics and have the capability for rapid 
automated digital information exchange. Information is the 
basic ingredient that bonds and focuses effort at all levels, 
and its importance cannot be overstated (FMFM 3, 1993). 
Marine Corps armor units must capitalize on existing 
information opportunities by utilizing performance enhancing 
digital command and control (C2) technology. The benefits 
that can be realized from the adoption of a battalion and 
below level digital command and control system include: 
• Enhanced battlefield integration/synchronization; 
• A  more  rapid  and  accurate  dissemination  of 
intelligence; 
• An increased ability to command and control on the 
move ; 
• A greater degree of situational awareness and friendly 
force identification capability. 
Together, these potential benefits represent our grasping of 
existing battlefield information opportunities and provide the 
armer  force  a  revolutionary  increase  in  warfighting 
CapcC'lilüy . 
Effective battlefield integration and synchronization is 
achieved when commanders are able to accurately and timely 
maneuver their forces in such a manner as to gain a decided 
advantage over the enemy. This maneuver of ground forces must 
be coordinated with the potentially devastating effects of 
supporting arms. Indirect fires and air support must be 
effectively integrated and synchronized with direct fire 
assets to bring an overwhelming degree of firepower on the 
enemy. This integration and synchronization can be achieved 
through battlefield digitization. Digitizing the battlefield 
gives forces the ability to rapidly share information across 
functional areas. The design of communication systems for the 
exclusive use by a single organization or for a specific 
function or mission unnecessarily isolates that system and its 
users. It becomes a burden on the battlefield when its lack 
of connectivity hinders fluid operations. The system 
isolation or "stovepipe" effect which results from 
communication systems supporting a single specific mission, 
function, or organization would disappear with the 
introduction of a fully integrated digital network. The 
ability to send more information faster and with a greater 
degree of accuracy allows commanders to direct their maneuver 
forces and control their supporting arms assets in a more 
efficient man::er. 
A more rapid and accurate dissemination of intelligence 
up and down the chain of command is a further benefit of 
battlefield digitization. By the end of the decade, the Army 
expects to have an airborne and ground-based signals 
intelligence/electronic warfare system capable of rapidly 
disseminating near-real-time intelligence with targeting 
accuracy to users at every level of command (Ross, 1994). The 
system will have the capability to collect and fuse 
intelligence from a variety of sensors, process the data, and 
send it to the organization that needs it. This sensor-to- 
shooter information flow will reduce the "fog of war", thereby 
increasing combat effectiveness. 
Because future battlefields will be characterized by 
faster tempo, requiring even faster reactions from units, the 
ability to command and control on the move is essential. 
Effective command and control cannot be achieved without the 
efficient flow of information up and down the chain of 
command. A commander on the battlefield makes decisions based 
upon  both  direct  personal  observations  and  indirect 
observations made from the collection of information from 
various sources.  After making his initial observations he 
orients himself to the situation, makes a decision,  and 
subsequently acts on the decision.  This decision cycle takes 
time, which on the battlefield is a precious commodity. Those 
commanders who can minimize the time it takes to execute this 
decision cycle give themselves a decided advantage in high- 
tempo combat operations. An integrated digital battle command 
system can offer commanders data burst communications combined 
with video displays, automatic position location, and far 
target  designation  capabilities.    Information  that    a 
commander needs to base his observations on can be transmitted 
faster, with a higher degree of accuracy, and in formats 
conducive to easy understanding.  Timely intelligence and the 
greater degree of situational awareness that a digital system 
can provide will allow commanders to increase  the speed in 
which they execute their decision cycles.  In addition, an 
integrated  digital  communication  system will  allow  the 
commander  to  disseminate  his  orders  more  quickly  and 
efficiently, further speeding force execution times. The goal 
is to never have to react to the actions of the enemy, but to 
have him always reacting to you.  Digitization will allow the 
accomplishment of this goal and will contribute greatly to the 
tank battalion's primary mission of providing overwhelming 
combat power to the Marine Division. 
Recent  friendly  fire  incidents  (e.g.,  the  highly 
publicized  occurrences  during  Operation  Desert  Storm) 
emphasize the importance of situational awareness and friendly 
force identification. Maneuver warfare demands that the C2 
support system create a common situational awareness 
throughout the battlespace by rapidly sharing information 
among the commander, his staff, key decisionmakers, and 
supporting forces (FMFM 3, 1993). Navigation aids such as the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Enhanced Position 
Location Reporting System (EPLRS), when included in an 
integrated and fully distributed digital network, allow 
commanders to know exactly where their forces are on the 
battlefield. Digital technology gives commanders the ability 
to see a picture of the battlefield. In addition to the 
automatic friendly position updates sent through digital 
links, the commander has access to every reported enemy 
position as well. Whether collected through sensors and 
disseminated down, or seen by subordinate units and reported 
up, the commander has access to a near real time battlefield 
picture. This better awareness of friendly and enemy forces 
decreases confusion, improves decisions by leaders, increases 
the tempo of operations, and reduces the potential for 
fratricide. 
B.  CONCEPT VALIDATION THROUGH SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
Simulation provides military decision-makers a very cost- 
effective method to evaluate new system concepts before actual 
system hardware is fielded. By simulating and testing the 
capabilities of a digital combat information system, possible 
system design faults and overlooked functional requirements 
can be identified prior to the system's fielding. Large-scale 
modifications and costly corrective reworks can thus be 
avoided. The primary focus of simulation analysis of 
battalion and below command and control systems has been the 
Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS). The IVIS is a 
computer-based distributed information management system that 
is designed to enhance command, control, and communication 
(C3) abilities at lower echelon levels. This description 
compares favorably with the TCO Armor and MACCK analyzed in 
this thesis. The following discussion will illustrate to what 
extent a digital command and control system can enhance 
warfighting capabilities at the battalion and below level. A 
simulation-based assessment of IVIS capabilities performed by 
the Army's advanced experimental test bed, Simulation Network- 
Developmental (SIMNET-D), and a Combat Synchronization 
Analysis performed by the U.S. Army Armor Center on JANUS, a 
combat simulation system, will be presented. 
1.  SIMNET-D 
The Army's SIMNET-D test bed interactively links a 
variety of combined arms simulators, including Ml tanks, 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles, FAADS, and A-10 and Apache 
aircraft, along with microcomputers representing tactical, 
administrative, and logistical combat service support 
elements. The vehicle simulators model real world system 
behavior to a degree where users can perceive them as 
acceptably realistic. Individual simulators have the ability 
to model realistic battlefield conditions, equipment status, 
and -weapon system performance, and are linked and updated 
across an Ethernet.  (DuBois, et al., 1991) 
SIMNET-D was used to determine the performance effects on 
crew and platoon size units of a prototype IVIS system in an 
Ml tank simulator. IVIS equipped crew and platoon performance 
was compared to the performance of crews and platoons without 
IVIS. In the control condition (no IVIS), crews and platoons 
were required to plan and execute a C3 exercise and combat 
missions using conventional C3 tools. Radio network 
communications, the field of view from the tank's vision 
blocks and sights, the azimuth indicator (for direction), and 
a paper map with a mission graphic overlay were used by the 
control group.  Crews and platoons in the IVIS experimental 
group were, in addition to conventional C3 tools, equipped 
with IVIS. Features of IVIS which were modeled for the 
simulation included a terrain map display with own-tank and 
friendly tank position icons, location and heading information 
indicated digitally in a separate window and on the map 
display, a touch sensitive display with various operational 
functions, and a digital communications network separate from 
the tank's radio system. (These features are present in or 
are under development for the TCO Armor and the MACCK.) 
The initial hypothesis was that IVIS equipped crews and 
platoons would perform better across a variety of objective 
criterion measures than would non-IVIS crews and platoons. 
This hypothesis proved true. Crews with IVIS required less 
than half the time of non-IVIS crews to plan and execute the 
C3 exercise. IVIS crews sent more timely, complete, and 
accurate own-location and battlefield reports, and 
successfully executed more exercise change of mission, 
obstacle bypass, battle position, and call-for-fire tasks. 
Platoons with IVIS successfully completed the offensive and 
defensive combat missions more frequently, completed more 
mission segments, successfully executed more fragmentary 
orders, and sent more accurate own-location and battlefield 
reports than did platoons without IVIS. (DuBois, et al . , 1991) 
This simulation strongly suggests that crew and platoon 
combat performance will be significantly enhanced by the 
presence of a digital command and control system. While the 
relationship between crew and platoon performance in SIMNET-D 
and in the real world have yet to be fully validated, the 
unfailing superior performance of IVIS units in SIMNET-D 
should be used as a strong indicator of the merits of a 
digital combat information system. 
10 
2.  Combat Synchronization Model 
The Combat Synchronization Model was developed to focus 
on the contributions of digitized information systems to the 
overall effectiveness of the brigade and below combat unit. 
This model simulates the information network within brigade 
and below tactical combat units. By entering data concerning 
frequency, transmission time, and processing time of tactical 
information, the time required for units to react to 
battlefield situations is determined. Like-data of digitized 
and non-digitized units can be collected and fed into the 
model to develop useful comparisons between digitized and non- 
digitized units. The resultant time differences can then be 
incorporated into a combat simulation system (JANUS), where 
the performance of digitized and non-digitized units can be 
compared in various simulated scenarios. This process allows 
the identification of quantifiable combat effectiveness 
performance measures by which to compare different command and 
control systems. 
The study objectives of this Combat Synchronization 
Analysis were: 
• Study the time element of current data on information 
flow in tactical units. 
• Use available small unit data (collected largely from 
the previously described simulation-based assessment) 
to determine larger unit decision cycles. 
• Develop a method for utilizing reaction times in 
current combat simulations to evaluate digital battle 
command, and develop insights by examining combat 
payoffs. (Combat Synchronization Analysis) 
In order to achieve these objectives the Armor Center 
used data developed in the previously described assessment to 
input into a network model which replicated the communication 
paths within company, battalion, and brigade level units. 
Total delay times for the flow of information and orders were 
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determined and imposed on units within JANUS. JANUS combat 
simulations were then run for digitized and non-digitized 
units. The four different scenarios that were gamed for the 
digitized and non-digitized units were: 
• Southwest Asia Meeting Engagement 
• Europe Flank Guard 
• Northeast Asia Hasty Attack 
• Bosnia Quick Reaction Force 
Distinct methods of effectiveness/performance were 
extracted from each scenario and served as the basis for 
comparison of the digitized and non-digitized units. The 
primary measures of performance were: 
• Decision cycle times (time for critical information to 
reach the correct destination, combined with the time 
required for appropriate action to be taken). 
• Time to bring supporting weapons to bear. 
• Mission execution time. 
• Weapons utilization rates (how many systems 
participated in the battle over time). 
• Volume of fires (direct and indirect - over time). 
• Enemy and friendly losses over time. 
• Contribution of each friendly weapon system to total 
enemy kills.  (US Army Armor Center) 
Across all scenarios the digitized force proved superior 
to the non-digitized as evaluated by the above 
effectiveness/performance measures. In reviewing the 
simulation output several general trends which reflected the 
oenefit of digital command and control systems over voice 
command and control systems became apparent. These trends 
include: 
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• Digital battle command saves time in moving information 
within and between units. The advantage in time 
increases for larger units and for complicated 
procedures . 
. Units react more swiftly to battlefield events with 
digital battle command. 
• Radio net utilization drops slightly when using digital 
battle command, yet much more information is passed. 
• Leaders (especially at higher level staffs) experience 
dramatic increases in the amount of information 
requiring processing. 
. Information sent using digital systems is more current 
and accurate than voice delivered information. (US 
Army Armor Center) 
These trends illustrate the benefits waiting to be reaped 
by the adoption of a distributed and fully integrated digital 
command and control system. While simulation has, at low 
cost, revealed the potential of battlefield digitization, only 
the testing and fielding of actual systems will prove the 
worthiness of digital command and control. However, in 
conjunction with system testing and before the fielding phase 
of the acquisition process, a detailed economic analysis of 
candidate digitization systems must be completed to identify 
those systems which can offer the desired benefits at an 
affordable cost. 
Improving all aspects of C2 is the key to fighting 
smarter. Having belatedly come to recognize this 
fact, we can't afford to ignore it just because 
defense budgets shrink. Improved C2 will continue 




III.  OVERVIEW OF COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest problems facing military decision 
makers is how to achieve the greatest amount of combat 
effectiveness at a low cost. The following is a brief 
summary of how military leaders tackle this difficult problem. 
The first step is to assess the global threat and define 
a strategy to meet it. Leaders at the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) develop the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), which provides the services the force 
and fiscal guidance necessary to construct their programs. It 
gives the services a fiscal constraint in the form of total 
obligational authority with which to base the development of 
their Program Objective Memoranda (POM). 
The POM is a six-year planning document submitted by the 
service secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. It contains 
recommendations for the detailed application of service 
resources. As part of a continual review of the information 
on proposed uses of service resources, the services conduct an 
assessment of risks and an evaluation of the military 
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative (Practical 
Comptrollership, 1994) . Included in this review are estimates 
of alternative program costs and benefits. 
Fierce competition among proposed programs for scarce 
fiscal resources requires program sponsors to defend their 
programs with relevant, detailed, and accurate data. A 
Program Strategy Board is tasked with the responsibility of 
final program approval. This board is faced with numerous 
alternatives from which to choose the most cost effective mix 
of programs to meet the service strategy. A cost/benefit 
analysis is one process by which the cost and benefits of 
alternative weapon systems can be assessed and compared. This 
analysis  can  provide  both  quantified  and  subjective 
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information to support a rational decision of which candidate 
weapon systems to procure. 
B.  WEAPON SYSTEM COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
1.  Techniques 
There are two basic approaches for making comparisons in 
cost/benefit analysis: (1) the fixed budget approach and (2) 
the fixed effectiveness approach. (Fisher, 1970) 
a. Fixed Budget Approach 
Using the fixed budget approach an analyst compares 
the likely levels of effectiveness to be attained by each 
alternative given a fixed budget. In other words, he 
determines the "best" system that can be purchased with 
limited available funding. In the case where combat 
information systems are being compared, the analyst must 
concern himself with both the quality of the individual system 
and the number of total systems required to meet mission 
needs. The level of combat effectiveness which can be 
achieved by the implementation of a combat information system 
is dependent upon the degree of its integration and 
distribution within the battlefield communication network. 
Therefore, the system's effectiveness is heavily dependent 
upon the number of systems that can be afforded. If 2000 
units of a system are required to fulfill organizational 
needs, then the job of the cost/benefit analyst is to find the 
system that will provide the greatest amount of benefit at a 
2000 unit procurement level and within the available budget. 
b. Fixed Effectiveness Approach 
In the fixed effectiveness approach for weapon 
system alternative comparison, the analyst attempts to 
determine the alternative which can achieve a specified level 
of effectiveness at the lowest economic cost (Fisher, 1970). 
The goal of achieving a desired level of effectiveness can be 
viewed in two different ways. 
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The first is to meet a quantitative performance 
measure, such as a fixed degree of destructive capability. 
When making comparisons between alternatives in this manner an 
effectiveness analysis is needed to determine the quantity of 
each alternative required to meet the desired level of 
effectiveness. Once this task is accomplished, the costs of 
each alternative are determined and compared. The alternative 
with the lowest economic cost is chosen to meet the goal. 
The second is to meet an organizational requirement for 
a fixed number of systems to be fielded. In this case the 
required quantity of each alternative is fixed. The 
effectiveness analysis concentrates on unit performance 
parameters vice aggregate performance capability. The goal is 
to acquire a batch of systems that meet predefined performance 
parameters at the lowest cost possible. 
2.  Measurement of Cost 
"No decisionmaker can sensibly claim to be comparing the 
cost and benefits of his decisions unless he has a clear and 
defensible notion about the meaning of 'cost'." (Fisher, 1970) 
In its most basic sense, a cost is a benefit lost. The cost 
of pursuing one option is the benefit foregone from not 
pursuing another. The military capability that is sacrificed 
when resources are used for one project instead of another is 
the cost of that project. This relatively abstract concept is 
brought to earth when costs are estimated and measured in 
concrete terms. 
a. Life  Cycle  Cost  Estimation 
Because the objective of the cost/benefit analysis 
under discussion is to assist the decision maker in making 
choices among future weapon system alternatives, the cost of 
the candidate systems must be estimated. A generally accepted 
measure of cost is the dollar. As such, an estimate of the 
dollar expenditures associated with the procurement of a 
weapon system is commonly used as an estimate of that system's 
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cost. The life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) is the most 
complete predictive measure of a weapon system's future cost. 
It is an estimate of the total cost to the government to 
acquire and own a system. This includes the cost of research 
and development, procurement, and operation and support 
(Fitzgerald, 1990). This thesis will utilize the LCCE of each 
candidate system as the measure of its cost. There exist five 
primary cost estimating methodologies: industrial 
engineering; specific analogy; estimating relationships; 
extrapolation; and expert opinion. 
(1) Industrial Engineering Method. Also 
referred to as the cost accounting method, this bottom-up 
approach details each task associated with the completion of 
a project with a comprehensive work breakdown structure. 
"Estimating by industrial engineering procedures can be 
broadly defined as an examination of separate segments of work 
at a level of detail and a synthesis of the many detailed 
estimates into a total." (Cost Estimating Reference Book, 
1991) The cost estimation of each specific task is then 
conducted, with the aggregation of each estimate forming the 
program cost estimate. Because of the level of detail 
involved, a huge amount of personnel and material data is 
required to make an accurate industrial engineering cost 
estimate. Hence, the cost in fiscal terms and in time is 
often considered unduly prohibitive. 
(2) Specific Analogy Method. The specific 
analogy method can be used when the physical attributes of a 
proposed system are similar to those of an existing system. 
When this is the case, it can be assumed that similarities in 
cost will also exist. If an existing tank weighing 60 tons 
which can achieve a speed of 40 miles per hour required a 
production cost of X, then a proposed armored vehicle with an 
estimated -weight of 55 tons and speed of 45 miles per hour 
should have a similar cost. 
Analogy is used by many private firms which have 
detailed information on only their own products. This is an 
appropriate method when the historical data required for 
statistical estimating or the detailed data required for 
industrial estimation is not available or is too costly to 
obtain. Further, the specific analogy method could be used to 
validate other cost estimating approaches. 
The major downside of cost estimation by analogy is 
that it is essentially judgmental in nature. In order to 
achieve accuracy with any degree of regularity the estimator 
must possess a significant amount of experience and expertise. 
The benefit of a low cost of estimation must be weighed with 
the potentially  devastating  cost  of  a very  inaccurate 
estimate. 
(3) Estimating Relationships. Parametric cost 
estimating techniques utilize output characteristics such as 
weight, speed, or power to predict costs. While the 
industrial engineering approach depends on a detailed analysis 
of the inputs to a system, the estimating relationship method 
develops, through the use of historical data, a cost 
estimating relationship (CER). The CER is developed by 
statistically fitting a line or function to a set of related 
historical data (e.g., cost vs. weight, cost vs. speed). A 
projection of the cost of a future system is then calculated 
by substituting its weight (or the appropriate parameter) in 
the equation (Cost Estimating Reference Book, 1991). 
Parametric estimating methods are particularly 
useful during the early phases of a weapon system's 
development. During this early period program developers 
define the mission and performance parameters that the system 
must achieve. The analyst can, in a very cost effective 
manner, develop modified estimates based on historical data to 
match inevitable changes in system performance requirements. 
This sensitivity analysis information provides the program 
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sponsor valuable ammunition with which to defend his program. 
Some key drawbacks to the parametric approach 
can limit its effectiveness as an estimating tool. The 
development of worthwhile estimates depends on the 
availability of an extensive database of historical system 
performance information. Statistical methods tell us that as 
the population of relevant data points grows larger, so does 
the probability of achieving a more accurate estimate. 
However, this avenue of reasoning assumes that the 
relationships existing between explanatory and dependent 
variables in the sample will continue for the system being 
evaluated. This may not be the case when advances in 
technology push future programs further from previously 
established and accepted performance envelopes. 
(4) Extrapolation Method. The extrapolation 
method is an extension of the analogy method where estimates 
are extrapolated from the actual cost data of a prior system. 
This method is useful when the system under investigation is 
a modification of an existing system. Because the 
modification will share many of the same characteristics of 
its parent system, the cost data can be readily extrapolated 
and used for the cost estimation of the modified program. 
This method is especially useful and inexpensive to developers 
who embark upon modification programs of their own systems. 
(5) Expert Opinion. A cost estimation derived 
from expert opinion, while usually influenced by another 
approach, is highly subjective in nature. It is nothing more 
than an opinion generated by an individual expert in the field 
or a group of experts. The fact that separate estimates 
developed by different experts of equal competence can vary 
greatly makes this a suspect technique. Although it is the 
least expensive cost estimation technique, it is probably the 
most untrustworthy. While the prudent program manager should 
not totally disregard the opinion of an expert, he should 
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strive to validate it with a more formal approach. 
b.     Time 
Time is money. The relevance of this often-used 
phrase is made clear when the issue of time is dealt with in 
a dynamic systems analysis. The LCCE of a weapon system 
considers the relevant stream of costs to be incurred by the 
development, procurement, and operation of the system over 
time. For the same reasons that a dollar in hand today is 
worth more than a dollar available a year from now, resources 
which are spent on weapons programs in the present are worth 
more than those spent in the future. This is the concept 
behind the procedure of discounting. Before dollars which are 
spent or received in different periods can be meaningfully 
added together, future dollars must be discounted, because 
they are worth less than current dollars (Fisher, 1970). 
"while the actual procedure of discounting is simple, the 
selection of an appropriate discount rate is often difficult. 
For this reason the concept of discounting is often ignored, 
to be replaced by the related but different technique of 
dollar escalation. 
Cost estimates are sometimes presented in specific 
fiscal year terms. The use of inflation indices allows the 
analyst to compensate for the decreasing value of the dollar. 
Future costs, while presented in constant year terms, reflect 
a higher level of spending for the same resources. In other 
words, a widget that costs $1.00 in 1994 may cost $1.10 in 
1995 if the inflation index used is 10% per year. 
3.  Measurement of Benefits 
Typically, benefits are divided into the categories of 
tangible and intangible. The accurate evaluation of these 
very different types of benefits assists the decision maker in 
choosing between alternatives. 
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a. Tangible Benefits 
Tangible benefits are those which can easily be 
measured in dollar terms. An example of a potential tangible 
benefit resulting from the adoption of a new weapon system is 
manpower cost reductions. If the new weapon system allows for 
a decrease in operating or support personnel, the manpower 
cost savings could be easily calculated. If fewer new systems 
are required to take the place of existing systems there may 
exist an easily determined cost savings in the form of less 
required support materials or a smaller amount of storage 
space. These are straightforward and plainly defensible 
benefits to weapon system acquisition programs. However, 
these concrete benefits are sometimes hard to find. This is 
the case with the C2 systems analyzed in this thesis. 
b. Intangible Benefits 
Intangible benefits are those which are exceedingly 
difficult or impossible to translate into a monetary value. 
This describes the benefits of digital command and control 
discussed in the preceding chapter. An increased ability to 
command and control on the move or a greater degree of 
situational awareness are benefits to which a monetary value 
car. not be attached. Should they then be ignored in a 
cost/benefit analysis? Of course not. These benefits have 
been given an implicit value by the fact that the effort to 
acquire a digital command and control capability at the 
battalion and below level has been initiated. This implies 
that DOD officials value these benefits more than the 
potential benefits which could be realized from another 
program using the same funding. Additionally, while the 
benefits from digital C2 cannot be valued in a monetary sense, 
they can be quantified in a meaningful way. This was 
accomplished through the simulation analysis discussed in the 
previous chapter. This analysis has validated the recognized 
appreciation for digitized C2 benefits.  The question remains 
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as to which proposed system will make these potential benefits 
a reality. 
c.     Benefits and Alternative Comparison 
When cost/benefit analysis is utilized to aid a 
decision maker in choosing between alternatives, three 
distinct component elements of the alternatives must be 
considered: the common component; the specified differences 
and; the remaining, unspecified differences (Fisher, 1970). 
When analyzing candidate command and control systems, the 
common component is the group of defined benefits provided by 
a generic C2 system meeting predefined performance 
requirements. Specified differences are non-existent in this 
case. Both systems must meet the same performance and 
organizational requirements. They each must be able to 
perform the same task at some minimum level of efficiency. 
Therefore, it is the unspecified differences in the systems 
which must be evaluated. The differences to be focused on in 
this analysis are cost and those areas where performance 
levels exceed or do not meet the minimum requirements. 
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IV.  TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM CORE REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of a tactical data system (TDS) is to improve 
the quality and flow of battlefield information so that 
commanders at all levels can make and communicate informed 
decisions consistently faster than the enemy. This allows 
friendly forces to maintain a proactive posture, keeping the 
enemy off-balance with a tempo of operations that he cannot 
match. 
The TDS will consist of software, hardware, and system 
integration to enable combat and combat support forces to 
exchange information and interact effectively on the 
battlefield. To achieve its purpose, the TDS must provide 
functionality in four primary areas. 
• Situational Awareness 
• Communication Management 
• Execution of Command and Control 
• Combat Support and Combat Service Support 
The following is a discussion of system performance 
applications which support each functional area. I will 
discuss required and desired applications. Additionally, I 
will discuss requirements that fall outside of the primary 
functional areas but which are necessary for the successful 
operation of the TDS. 
The reference materials I draw upon to define these 
requirements include: a 22 April '94 report from the 
Digitization of the Battlefield Working Group, established by 
the Director, C4I2, Marine Corps Systems Command; Attachment 
A (Applique Functional Requirements) to the U.S. Army's 
request for proposal, for Brigade 96; and the Operational 
Requirements Document for Force XXI Battle Command - Brigade 
and Below (FBCB2), generated by the U.S. Army's Training and 
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Doctrine Command. 
A.  SITDATIONAL AWARENESS 
The concept of situational awareness is defined as 
"...the accurate, near real-time, situational data and 
enhanced graphic/visual presentations, to provide "real-time" 
awareness of the changing situation." (RFP, 1994) In order 
for the TDS to provide this common picture of the battlefield 
to all users, it must possess the following capabilities. 
1.  Position/Navigation (POS/NAV) 
The TDS must be capable of identifying, displaying, and 
communicating the platform physical location to an eight-digit 
grid coordinate accuracy level. The platform's position must 
be displayed on an accurately depicted digital map using 
standard military symbology. Further, the capability to 
display the location of every other platform on the 
communication network carrying a compatible TDS is required. 
On query, the system must be able to display the icon of 
subordinate and adjacent units on their calculated center of 
mass location. It shall also display the icon of a higher 
headquarters unit on its location when queried. Friendly unit 
icon location and status information should be automatically 
updated, and automatically displayed, if desired. When an 
icon is selected by the user, its position and status 
information should be displayed. 
The system must have features for automatic or manual 
position selection for reporting purposes. That is, the user 
will have the capability to manually enter his position by 
choosing a point on the map or automatically from his POS/NAV 
device. Also, the system shall provide the option to manually 
or automatically transmit and receive position reports. 
Position reports must identify the sender and his location, 
heading, speed, and altitude. 
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Two conditions will cause automatic position updates to 
be transmitted at selectable time intervals: 1) if the 
platform changes its position by more than some specified 
amount, and 2) a maximum time span, regardless of platform 
movement. 
The TDS must include a navigation support capability. At 
a minimum this capability should allow for the graphical 
generation of routes and waypoints, current speed and heading, 
time/distance information, and a steer-to function which 
informs the driver which direction to steer in order to return 
to a designated route. 
2. Digital Map Display 
The TDS shall provide the capability to load and 
display standard DMA map products at the scale of 1/50,000. 
Included will be the desired capability to scroll and the 
required capabilities to zoom in/out (1/25,000 and 1/100,000), 
jump to a manually selected point, and convert between 
latitude/longitude and Universal Transmeridian (UTM) 
references. The TDS shall also display map datum information. 
3. Imagery Reception and Display 
It is desired that the TDS possess the capability to 
receive, integrate, and display satellite and aerial imagery. 
Images should be georeferenced and displayed with explanatory 
textual information. A terrain analysis capability should 
exist to facilitate navigational planning. 
B.  COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT 
Communication management is the process of placing 
critical information at the right place, at the right time, 
and in a form that influences appropriate action (FMFM-3, 
1994;. To achieve effective communication management, the TDS 
must meet the following requirements, as identified in the 
Army's Request for Proposal (RFP) for Brigade 96. 
The  TDS  must  provide  a  highly  flexible,  dynamic 
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networking capability that addresses and routes messages with 
little or no user intervention. Network flexibility must 
allow independent TDS units to enter and leave communication 
nets quickly. This allows the network to accommodate changes 
in task organization and mission. 
When a TDS enters or leaves a net, all users on that net 
must be made aware of the change. The TDS shall dynamically 
monitor all communication networks of which it is a part and 
create a listing, by network, of active users. This listing 
must be updated for additions and deletions automatically, and 
should be available, by query, to the user. 
The TDS must be responsive to changes in the role it may 
play. For example, should a commander's vehicle be destroyed, 
the TDS on the platform he assumes must be able to accommodate 
the increased communications burden. It must easily be re- 
programmed to automatically forward data to different 
addresses. This is accomplished by allowing the user to 
select pre-programmed individual addressees, addressee groups, 
and broadcast groups. 
The TDS shall provide the user a visual notification upon 
the receipt of all messages. An audible notification is 
desirable. This would especially be useful in identifying 
messages designated by the sender as requiring a WILCO (will 
comply). Additionally, the TDS will provide the ability to 
furnish acknowledgment of the receipt of messages. However, 
the TDS will also provide the capability to monitor a network 
without providing acknowledgements so as not to interfere with 
the data transmissions within the net. 
The TDS must permit non-attended receipt of messages and 
overlays. All messages, read and unread, must be stored and 
easily recalled. Messages/overlays should be saved to non- 
volatile memory on a first in/first out, message priority 
queued basis. This would allow high priority messages to take 
precedence over more recently received but lower priority 
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messages. Also, the TDS will display a message to the user 
when more than a user-specified number of unread messages are 
in the queue. Finally, the TDS shall not attempt to initiate 
a data transmission that would interfere or conflict with 
voice transmissions. 
C.  EXECUTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Joint Pub. 1-02 defines command and control as: 
. . . the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned forces 
in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and 
control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed 
by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations 
in the accomplishment of the mission. 
An effective TDS will support this definition and aid in 
reaching the ultimate objective of command and control, to 
achieve unity of effort and increase the tempo of operations. 
The TDS must provide the capability to execute command and 
control with a minimum amount of user interface. It must 
support the rapid generation, transmission, and undistorted 
receipt of overlays and messages necessary to execute 
commands. These overlays and messages should include 
autofilled entries which provide, at a minimum, unit 
identification, date-time group, location, and message number. 
The TDS software shall support, at a minimum, the overlays and 
messages described below. 
1.  Overlays 
The TDS software shall create, move, copy, delete, print, 
store, transmit, and display standard military overlay 
information and free text on a digital map. Desired is the 
capability to free-hand draw graphic and textual entries on an 
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overlay. The TDS must support, at a minimum, the creation of 
the following overlays: maneuver, intelligence, obstacle and 
fire support. The overlays shall be able to be displayed 
individually or in combinations that integrate to show a more 
complete picture of the battlefield. In order to reduce data 
traffic, the software must be designed in a manner that allows 
the transmission of only changes to current overlays. 
However, the TDS should automatically send complete overlays 
to new members entering the net, and should include an overlay 
update command that transmits the most recent of each overlay 
type to the designated receiver or receivers in one package. 
Minimum overlay content is listed below. 
a. Maneuver Overlay 
The maneuver overlay shall address: 
• Friendly unit designator, type, and size (e.g., 
designator= 5th Marines, 1st Tanks, etc.; type= Armor, 
Headquarters, etc.; size= platoon, battalion, etc.) 
• Weapon types (e.g., tank, artillery, automatic weapon, 
etc . ) 
• Control points (e.g., waypoint, checkpoint, observation 
point, Target Reference Point (TRP), etc.) 
• Control Lines (e.g., phase lines, boundaries, axis of 
advance, etc.) 
• Areas (battle position, objective, no fire zone, etc.) 
b. Intelligence  Overlay 
The intelligence overlay shall address: 
• Enemy unit designator, type, and size 
• Enemy weapon types 
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c. Obstacle Overlay 
The obstacle overlay shall address: 
• Mines (anti-tank, anti-personnel, phony, etc.) 
• Vehicle  obstacles  (tank  ditches,  berms,  posts, 
blockades, etc.) 
• Personnel obstacles (wire, booby-traps, etc.) 
• Identified passage points through obstacle belts and 
natural obstacles 
d. Fire Support Overlay 
The fire support overlay shall address: 
• Identification and locations of friendly fire support 
units (artillery, naval gunfire, mortars, close air 
support, and close-in fire support) 
• Permissive   fire   support   coordination  measures 
(coordinated fire line, free fire area, etc.) 
• Restrictive fire support coordination measures (no fire 
area, airspace coordination area, etc.) 
• Other control measures (boundaries, tactical areas of 
responsibility, etc.) 
• Targets (planned fires) 
• Ammunition supply points 
• Desired are range indicators for mortar and artillery 
types 
2.  Messages 
The TDS shall create, display, receive, prioritize, copy, 
edit, delete, print, store, and transmit data supporting 
messages. Templates, with prompts to assist the operator, 
shall be created for the following message types. 
• Spot Report 
• Situation Report (SITREP) 
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Warning Order 
Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 
Contact Report 
Call for Fire 
Close Air Support 
Close-in Fire Support 
Air Alert 
NBC Reports and Alerts 
Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Report 
MEDEVAC Message 
Fire Support Plan (to be attached to the fire support 
overlay) 
A far target designation capability is required to 
automatically generate and display the eight digit grid 
coordinate to any target that is designated by the platform's 
laser rangefinder. Further, the lasing event should 
automatically generate a spot report, with the position of the 
target included, to be transmitted on command. 
Additionally, a free text message capability, with the 
capability to cut and paste from a free text document, is 
essential. 
D.  COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 
The TDS shall provide the user with combat support and 
combat service support capabilities to include battle planning 
support, logistics information support, and administrative 
support. This capability is intended to be used when planning 
and coordination time are available. The following overlay 
and messages shall be included to support this facet of 
battlefield planning and coordination. 
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1. Overlay 
The TDS software shall provide for the display on an 
overlay of results of reconnaissance (e.g., route, obstacle, 
etc.),  commander's critical information requirements, and 
combat replay (an archival capability to display the last user 
designated period of overlays). 
2. Messages 
The software shall support, at the minimum, the following 
messages: 
Logistics Reports (Classes I through IX) 
Maintenance Support 
Medical Information 
Personnel Status Report (PERSTAT) 
Personnel Battle Loss Report 
Operations Order (OPORD) 
Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) 
Desired is the capability for the TDS to automatically 
recognize vehicle logistic requirements and operational 
status. The flexibility to manually or automatically report 
logistic status should exist. Further, at each level of 
command, the capability should exist to accumulate reports 
from the next subordinate level, consolidate them, and send 
them on a manual or automatic basis. 
E.  GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
. The TDS must allow the flow of information without 
regard to message format or protocols. This 
requirement makes clear the need for the use of common 
message formats and communication protocols on the 
battlefield. . 
. Voice and data must be able to be transmitted in such 
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a manner that one transmission does not interfere with 
the other.  This should be transparent to the user. 
3. The TDS must not degrade the mobility or 
maneuverability of the platform on which it resides. 
It must be capable of operating on the move and should 
not degrade the ability of any host platform to 
perform its primary function. 
4. TDS software will be "user friendly" to facilitate 
operation in a tactical environment. The use of 
modularity and an open architecture in system design 
is encouraged to facilitate rapid upgrades. 
5. Measures to reduce electronic countermeasure 
susceptibility must be considered. 
6. Information security measures must be considered. 
7. While the interoperability with all DoD equipment is 
desired, the priority of interoperability among the 
Services is: USMC systems, U.S. Navy systems, Joint 
Task force Commander C4I systems, and U.S. Army and 
U.S. Air Force systems. 
8. A remote display capability is desired.  This would 
allow the vehicle commander to manipulate the TDS from 
multiple positions in the vehicle. 
The above requirements are the base by which the two 
tactical data systems included in this thesis will be 
measured. Areas in which the systems exceed requirements or 
prove deficient will be considered in the comparison. 
Presented in the following chapter are the detailed physical 
and functional descriptions of each system. This data will be 
matched up with the requirements to reveal the level of 
conformity in each system. 
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V.  DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEMS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the information 
necessary to allow the reader to adequately understand the 
functional and physical operation of the TCO Armor and the 
MACCK. The functional description of each system as a whole 
is accompanied by the physical description of each major 
system component. While the MACCK has been fully developed 
and prototyped, the TCO Armor is still in its early 
developmental phase. As such, portions of the TCO Armor's 
functional and physical description will be of the system as 
it is currently envisioned. 
A.  TACTICAL COMBAT OPERATIONS (TCO) SYSTEM (ARMORED VEHICLE 
VARIANT) 
1.  Functional Description 
The TCO Armor is end-user equipment composed of 
ruggedized computer hardware, software, and input/output 
devices to provide automated data support for armored vehicle 
commanders. By providing functionality in the areas of 
sicuational awareness, communication management, execution of 
command and control, and combat support and combat service 
support, the TCO Armor meets the encompassing requirement of 
allowing combat and combat support forces to more efficiently 
exchange information and interact effectively on the 
battlefield. Discussed below is the functional description of 
the TCO Armor, relative to the four functional areas 
previously identified. 
a. Situational Awareness 
In keeping with the previously defined situational 
awareness requirements, the TCO Armor includes a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) interface to provide own location 
data, in latitude/longitude or UTM reference, to a one meter 
accuracy level. This information, presented as an icon on the 
calculated position on a standard DMA map, can be viewed on 
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the high resolution, multi-color display included in the 
system. The capability will exist to zoom in and out from a 
1/50,000 scale map to 1/25,000 and 1/100,000. 
Due to the networked nature of the digital 
battlefield, this information can be transmitted to any other 
compatible unit that is active on the network. This fully 
interactive system also allows for the positions of other 
specific platforms or units on the network to be received, 
automatically or on demand, and displayed. The display is 
updated automatically at a user-specified interval, or on 
demand. 
TCO Armor allows for the automatic or manual 
entering of position data in formatted reports. This gives 
the user the flexibility to type in his location, move the 
cursor to a point on the map and select it for his location, 
or allow the position of his own-unit icon to be automatically 
entered. 
The TCO Armor provides navigation support by 
allowing the user to program graphically displayed routes and 
sequentially numbered waypoints. Utilizing the GPS interface, 
the heading and distance from the platform's current position 
to a selected waypoint can be calculated. This information 
will be displayed for the vehicle commander on his display 
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b.     Communication Management 
TCO Armor provides the following communication 
management capabilities: 
• Creates  a  digital  network  by  interfacing  with 
compatible units via SINCGARS and/or PLRS 
• Allows the user to solicit manually information as to 
which users are active on the net 
• Provides the user a visual and, as envisioned, an 
audible notification of incoming messages 
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. Provides the capability for voice transmissions to 
override data transmissions 
• Stores all messages and overlays to non-volatile memory 
and indicates to the user the amount of remaining disk 
capacity 
• Provides an auto-forward capability which allows 
messages and overlays to be automatically forwarded to 
designated addresses upon receipt. 
c.     Execution of Command and Control 
TCO Armor supports the execution of command and 
control in the following ways: 
• Creates,  moves,  copies,  deletes,  prints,  stores, 
transmits, receives, updates, and displays standard 
military overlay information and free text on a digital 
map 
• Includes autofilled entries on overlays and messages 
which include originating unit identification, date- 
time group of overlay/message transmission, originating 
unit location, and message number 
• Creates and manipulates maneuver, intelligence, 
obstacle, and fire support overlays 
• Integrates separate overlays 
• Creates, displays, receives, prioritizes, copies, edits 
deletes, prints, stores, and transmits data supporting 
messages 
• Creates templates for the required message types listed 
in the previous chapter 
• Provides a free text message capability 
• Eliminates redundancy of reports that cite the same 
event by utilizing algorithms to determine if multiple 
users are reporting the same target 
• Provides a far-target designation capability that 
automatically generates and displays the eight digit 
grid coordinate of the lased target 
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d.  Combat Support  and Combat  Service Support 
TCO Armor provides the following combat support and 
combat service support capabilities: 
• Displays on an overlay results of reconnaissance, 
commander's critical information requirements,  and 
combat replay 
• Supports the creation, edit, and transmission of the 
required combat and combat service support messages 
listed in the previous chapter 
2.  Physical Description 
The TCO Armor, as currently envisioned, consists of the 
following primary components: 
Computer Unit 
Hard Disk Drive (HDD) 
Chassis 
Display and Keyboard Unit 
GPS Receiver 
Laser Rangefinder with Magnetic Compass 
All components and the manner in which they interface are 
presented in Figure 1 . 
a. Computer Unit 
The computer unit will be a UNIX-based system 
consisting of three 6U VME boards and a VME bus backplane, 
which as a unit, will fit into a rugged MIL-SPEC 3-slot, 6U, 
VME card cage.  The three boards are described below. 
(1) Central Processing Unit. The CPU is an HP 
series 9000, Model 743i single board computer. This 6U X 
16 0mm VME circuit card provides numerous interfaces, to 
include one small computer systems interface (SCSI) for 
interface with the HDD, two RS-232 serial ports, one parallel 
























Fiaure   1.      TCO  Armor 
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port. It features a 64MHz PA-RISC 7100LC processor with 
built-in high-performance floating point co-processor with a 
256KB instruction/data cache for faster program execution 
times. The Model 743i can operate at temperatures ranging 
from -5 to 55 degrees Celsius and can be stored at a 
temperature range of -40 to 70 degrees Celsius. (Hewlett- 
Packard, 1994) 
(2) Graphics Processor. The graphics 
processor is the Vgs-882, a high performance color graphics 
server based on the LSI Logic LR33020 GraphX processor, 
contained on a single 6U VME board. The Vgs-882 has the 
ability to drive color active-matrix liquid crystal displays 
(LCDs), in addition to a wide range of analog monitors (Vigra, 
1993) 
(3) Tactical Communications Interface Module 
(TCIM).   The TCIM is a portion of the Army Tactical Command 
and Control Systems (ATCCS) Common Hardware and Software (CHS) 
program.  The TCIM, configured for use with the TCO Armor as 
a  6U VME circuit  card,  is a programmable  four-channel 
multipurpose communications device capable of communicating 
with a wide range of tactical communications equipment, to 
include the SINCGARS.  Interfacing with both voice and digital 
communications devices, the TCIM is ideal for the transmission 
and reception of secure and non-secure information for the TCO 
Armor. 
b.     Hard Disk Drive 
The HDD will utilize solid state technology to 
provide a more robust 2GB storage capability. Although this 
quantity of storage is not yet achievable with solid state 
technology, industry experts predict that a 2GB storage 
capacity will be reached in 1995. The drive will be mounted 
in a removable canister which can be inserted into a 
leceptacle which is permanently mounted inside the system 
chassis using vibration and shock isolators. 
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c. Chassis 
The system chassis is the ruggedized box that will 
hold the computer unit and HDD. Included in the chassis will 
be a heat exchanger, fans to induce forced air circulation, a 
DC to DC power supply with heat sink, an AC to DC power 
supply, a battery pack with battery charging circuitry, and a 
recessed connector panel and power switch. The chassis will 
be mounted to the receiving platform using vibration and shock 
isolators. 
d. Display and Keyboard unit 
The display and keyboard will function as the 
primary user interface for the TCO Armor. The keyboard will 
provide an alphanumeric data entry capability. Included on 
the keyboard will be a trackball to facilitate the user 
interface. While normally mounted as a single unit, the 
display and keyboard can be separated so that each component 
can be moved in and around the host platform. This provides 
the user an enhanced flexibility by not requiring that the 
operation of the TCO Armor take place in a fixed crew 
position. 
The display unit will be a 10.5 inch diagonal, high 
resolution, multi-color capable, liquid crystal display (LCD) 
panel with backlight assembly and power source. Included will 
be an analog to digital interface and a touch pen assembly for 
ease of data input or command selection. A series of "hot 
switches," each assigned a specific function, will be located 
on the border of the display panel. 
e. GPS Receiver 
The GPS receiver to be used with the TCO Armor is 
the AN-'PSN-ll Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR, 
"plugger") . The PLGR, now in production by Rockwell,, is a 
handheld or vehicle mountable unit with selective availability 
for instantaneous 10 meter location determination, one data 
port, one crypto port, and a five channel capability. 
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f.     Laser Rangefinder with Magnetic Compass 
The laser rangefinder with integrated compass that 
is currently being considered for use with the TCO Armor is 
the AN/PVS-6 Melios. The Melios is a seven pound handheld 
binocular and laser rangefinder with integrated display and 
data port. However, the compass portion of the unit, the 
combined vertical and azimuth modification (CVAM), will not be 
available until mid-1995. When included, the Melios will have 
the capability of giving an integrated range, azimuth and 
vertical angle to the display and data stream. 
B.  MÜLTI-APPLICATION COMMAND AND CONTROL KIT 
1.  Functional Description 
The following functional description of the MACCK was 
provided by General Dynamics Land Systems Division. 
The MACCK is a C3I system which prepares, collects, 
organizes, displays, and disseminates pertinent battlefield 
C3I information to task force assets at the battalion echelon 
and below. It provides a modular and flexible integration 
package designed to accommodate multiple vehicle installation 
requirements while maintaining a seamless command and control 
interface. Additionally, the MACCK provides a number of 
different functional performance levels which allow users to 
tailor the MACCK capabilities to the unique role of each 
specific vehicle installation. The three baseline capability 
packages are: 
• Command and Control Package 
• Autonomous Navigation Package 
• Far Target Designation Package 
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a. Command and Control Package 
The Command and Control Package provides the 
essential command and control capabilities necessary to 
integrate a vehicle platform on the digital battlefield. This 
package supports multiple digital communications protocols and 
message sets necessary to digitally integrate maneuver, 
aviation, artillery, and combat support assets. 
Interfacing with the SINCGARS and the Precision 
Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR), the Tactical Display Unit and 
the Command and Control Electronics Unit provide the command 
and control functions summarized as follows: 
• IVIS Protocol (See Chapter II for information on IVIS) 
• IVIS Message Sets (Reports and Overlays) (These include 
all reports and overlays defined in the requirements 
portion of the thesis) 
• TACFIRE Protocol (for interface with Army Field 
Artillery) 
• Field Artillery Message Subset 
• Logistics Report 
• Automatic Position Report Transmission 
• Grid Map for Mutual Position Location 
• Automatic Network Control for TACFIRE and IVIS 
b.     Autonomous Navigation Package 
The Autonomous Navigation Package, through the 
addition of an Inertial Reference Unit, a Distance Measurement 
Unit and a Driver's Navigation Display, provides the crew an 
autonomous capability to navigate the vehicle without external 
aide. This capability implements a dead reckoning algorithm 
to continuously calculate vehicle position and operates 
independent of the--GPS. Thus, if the GPS signal is 
unavailable, full navigation and route planning capabilities 
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are retained. 
The Inertial Reference Unit provides vehicle 
position and heading based on an earth and vehicle interface 
to provide distance travelled. Since Inertial Reference 
platforms are subject to drift with time and temperature, an 
interface to the Global Positioning System is used to 
periodically update the IRU to eliminate such drifts. 
Using the heading information of the IRU and 
waypoint information entered into the Tactical Display Unit by 
the commander, the MACCK electronics computes a trajectory to 
the waypoint. This information, presented to the driver in an 
alphanumeric format, guides him to the proper route to proceed 
to that waypoint. Using such a system, the driver is freed to 
use the terrain and foliage features to mask the vehicle. He 
can be confident that the computer is maintaining a continuing 
path to his desired objective. 
c.     Far Target  Identification Package 
The Far Target Identification Package provides an 
interface to a vehicle's Laser Rangefinder (LRF) and Turret 
Position Encoder. Such an interface allows targets to be 
iased from a vehicle and displayed on the Tactical Display 
Unit for automatic inclusion in reports and overlays. 
The Inertial Reference Unit provides vehicle hull 
heading. The Turret Position Encoder provides the relative 
rotational position of the turret with respect to the hull. 
The Laser Rangefinder gives distance to the target. Vector 
calculations result in the position of the target with respect 
to the originating vehicle. Since this computation is done 
within MACCK, the position of the target is automatically 
displayed on the Tactical Display Unit. The lasing event also 
triggers the automatic generation of a spot report by the 
system. The commander has a one-button ability to send the 
enemy position to friendly units. 
The MACCK analyzed in this thesis possesses the full 
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functionality described above. 
2.  Physical Description 
The MACCK is comprised of the following non-government 
furnished components: 
• Command and Control Electronics Unit 
• Tactical Display Unit 
• Inertial Reference Unit 
• Distance Measurement Unit 
• Driver's Navigation Display 
The SINCGARS radio, PLGR, Laser Rangefinder, and Turret 
Position Encoder are government furnished. All components and 
the manner in which they interface are presented in Figure 2. 
a. Command and Control  Electronics  unit 
The electronic modules of the Command and Control 
Electronics Unit include the following elements: 
• System  Processor  -  or  the  Bus  Controller/Remote 
Terminal Board 
• Tactical Graphics Module - drives graphics to the 
Tactical Display Unit 
• Extended Memory Module 
• Serial Input/Output Module - provides an interface to 
the external sensors 
• Two Radio Interface Boards 
Jb. Tactical  Display Unit 
The Tactical Display Unit features a high- 
resolution, multi-color capable panel and includes the 
following components: 
• Keypad - Alpha-numeric entry 
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Figure 2.  MACCK 
46 
• 4-Way Switch - Adjustment Functions (e.g., brightness) 
• Miscellaneous Switches - For example, On/Off 
A Panel Interface Module will be added to the TDU to 
interface to the switches and keypad. 
c. Inertial Reference  Unit 
The Inertial Reference Unit interfaces with the 
Command and Control Electronics Unit to provide it with 
vehicle position and heading. It uses a dead reckoning 
algorithm to continuously calculate vehicle position. 
d. Distance Measurement  Unit 
The Distance Measurement Unit interfaces with the 
Inertial Reference Unit to provide it with distance traveled 
information. This data is necessary for position calculation. 
e. Driver's Navigation Display 
The Driver's Navigation Display unit is a mono-color 
display panel located in the driver's compartment that 
presents navigation information. It presents to the driver, 
in an alphanumeric format, the magnetic azimuth required to 
steer to a predefined waypoint. 
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VI.  LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the 
difference in cost, to the Marine Corps, between the TCO Armor 
and the MACCK. To achieve this, only cost differences 
resulting from the procurement of alternative tactical data 
systems are considered. 
For example, regardless of whether the TCO Armor or the 
MACCK were procured by the Marine Corps, manpower and training 
costs associated with that procurement would be equal. The 
TCO Armor and the MACCK are designed to accomplish the same 
mission, supported by an equal amount of comparably trained 
personnel. Therefore, the manpower and training costs 
normally considered in a life cycle cost estimate are 
disregarded in this comparison. 
On the other hand, the procurement costs associated with 
the different systems do vary. This is a result of the 
different unit costs and number of spares required for each 
system. Because these costs differ, they are included in the 
life cycle cost comparison. 
The life cycle cost of a system reflects all costs 
incurred by that system from project initiation through 
termination. The following equation reflects this cumulative 
cost and is used as the model for determining the life cycle 
cost of the TCO Armor and the MACCK: 
LCC = R&D + PROCUREMENT + OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE. 
A.  GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions hold for the life cycle cost 
estimates of the TCO Armor and the MACCK. 
• That the life cycle cost estimates are based upon a 
one-time buy of 13 0 units. 
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• That the life cycle cost estimates are based upon an 
operating rate of 3952 hours/unit/year (1/3 of the year 
at 24 hours/day, 7 days/week, and 2/3 of the year, 6 
hours/day, 5 days/week). 
• That the service life of each TDS is 15 years. 
• That the hourly repair cost composite rate for lst-3rd 
echelon maintenance is the same for each TDS. 
• That the required availability rate for each TDS is 90 
percent. 
• That procurement costs are represented in current year 
dollars, while operations/maintenance costs are 
discounted over the 15 year life of the systems at a 
seven percent discount rate. (This discount rate is 
taken from OMB Circular A-94.) 
• That manpower and training costs will be comparable 
regardless of the TDS procured. Therefore, these costs 
are not considered in this comparison. 
• That the Marine Corps would negotiate comparable 
procedures and costs for contractor maintenance of 
hardware items regardless of the TDS procured. 
Therefore, maintenance costs for depot level 
maintenance are not considered in this comparison. 
• That only second and third echelon corrective 
maintenance costs are considered in this comparison. 
All other costs related to maintenance (i.e., 
preventive maintenance costs, test equipment costs) are 
assumed to be the same for each TDS. 
• That the mean time to repair reflects the only 
difference in maintenance cycle time between each TDS. 
• That test and evaluation costs would be comparable for 
each TDS. Therefore, they are not considered in this 
comparison. 
B.  TCO ARMOR LIFE CYCLE COST 
1.  Research and Development Cost 
The TCO Armor, as envisioned, is an extension of the 
existing TCO program. As such, funding for its research and 
development is provided by the Marine Corps, through the TCO 
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Project office. 
For  the purpose  of  this  comparison,  research and 
development costs equal the costs incurred in developing a 
hardware prototype plus costs required to modify existing TCO 
software to provide the functionality required of a TDS: 
R&D COST = HARDWARE R&D + SOFTWARE MODIFICATION. 
Because the TCO Armor is currently in the research and 
development phase, the full costs associated with hardware 
prototyping have yet to be determined. The amount budgeted 
for this endeavor is $250,000. This is the figure used in the 
comparison. 
Software modification involves the effort to enhance 
existing TCO software to include the functions required of a 
TDS that is used at levels below battalion. Expert opinion 
serves as the basis for an estimated one-time cost of $400,000 
(Price, 1994) . 
R&D Cost = $250,000 + $400,000 
The R&D cost for the TCO Armor is $650,000. 
2.  Procurement Cost 
The procurement cost for the TCO Armor is calculated by 
adding the number of units procured with the number of spare 
units required to support the fleet for a given number of 
hours of operation, and multiplying this total by the unit 
cost : 
PROCUREMENT COST = (UNITS + SPARES) X UNIT COST. 
The number of units used in this comparison is 13 0. 
While 100 or 1000 could just have easily been used to 
illustrate the cost difference between the TCO Armor and the 
XACCK, 130 reflects the number of units required to outfit the 
tanks in two Marine Corps tank battalions and one training 
company. 
Spare quantity determination is a function of a 
probability of having a spare available when required, the 
reliability of the item in question, and the quantity of items 
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used in the system (Blanchard, 1992) . In this comparison, the 
number of spares is based on a required operational 
availability level of 90 percent with a 100 hour maintenance 
turnaround time. Mean time between failure (MTBF) is the 
measure used to reflect the reliability of each TDS, while the 
quantity of items used in the Marine Corps system is 130. 
Figure 3 presents a nomograph, originally presented in 
NAVSHIPS 94324, and reprinted in Benjamin S. Blanchard's 
Logistics Engineering and Management, which simplifies the 
determination of spare quantities. The number to be plotted 
on the left side of the nomograph is determined by multiplying 
the number of items in the system, K, by the number of 
failures/1000 hours, lambda, by the maintenance turnaround 
time, T. The right side of the nomograph, P, represents the 
probability of having a spare available when required. This 
probability is equivalent to the operational availability 
rate. To determine the number of spares required, the product 
of K, lamda, and T is connected to the operational 
availability rate, P. The point where this line crosses the 
"Number of Spares" curve represents the quantity of spares 
required to support the fleet, given a 100 hour maintenance 
turnaround time and a 9 0 percent required availability rate. 
For the TCO Armor   K    =13 0 
lambda= 0.00164 
T    = 100 
P    =0.90 
Using the nomograph, approximately 28 spares are 
required. 
The system unit cost is the sum of the TCO Armor's 
individual component costs. In most cases, vendor quotes 
provided the source for the individual component costs. 
However, expert opinion was used to estimate the costs of the 
system chassis and hard disk drive (Price, 1994) . The 
component costs added to a total of $55,500. 
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Figure 3.  Spare Quantity Requirement Nomograph 
From'Ref. (Blanchard, 1992) 
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Procurement Cost = (130 + 28) X $55,500 
The procurement cost for the TCO Armor is $8,769,000. 
3.  Operations and Maintenance Cost 
In the pursuit of defining the cost differences between 
the TCO Armor and the MACCK, this portion of the life cycle 
cost estimate focused on hardware and software maintenance 
costs. The primary cost driver differences in this category 
were system MTBF and mean time to repair (MTTR). 
Hardware maintenance costs were derived by determining 
the number of system failures (based on MTBF) for a given 
number of operating hours. The MTBF for the TCO Armor, 609 
hours, was calculated by integrating the MTBF of each system 
component. By dividing this number into total operating hours 
(# of units x op hours/unit/year x service life) the total 
number of system failures over the service life of the systems 
was determined. This figure, multiplied by the MTTR of the 
TCO Armor, gives the total amount of time that corrective 
maintenance is actually being conducted. Preventative 
maintenance and other factors which contribute to the 
maintenance cycle time of a TDS were assumed to be equal for 
each system. The product of the corrective maintenance time 
and the hourly repair cost provides the hardware maintenance 
cost for the TCO Armor. This cost, discounted at 7% for 15 
years, is $458,646. 
The software maintenance cost estimate is based on expert 
opinion. It is estimated that future software maintenance 
costs for the TCO Armor will equal approximately ten percent 
of the software maintenance costs for the TCO. The TCO office 
currently pays $1,000,000/year for software maintenance. Over 
the 15 year service life of the TCO Armor software maintenance 
costs will equal $1,500,000. (Carlson, 1994) Although General 
Dynamics was unable to make an equivalent estimate for the 
MACCK, it can be assumed that the Marine Corps would negotiate 
a similar contract for software maintenance regardless of the 
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svstem procured. Therefore, software maintenance costs will 
r.ot be considered in this life cycle cost estimate. 
The discounted operations and maintenance cost for the 
TCO Armor is $458,646. 
Figure 4 provides a numerical summary for the life cycle 
cost of the TCO Armor. 
TCO Armor 
I Units 
I Unit Cost 
I Spares* 
: Service Life* 
ÜMT3F* 
iiMTTR* 
;i ReDair Cost* 
i: Hours/Unit/Year 
"o;ai CD Hours 
Disccjn: Rate 
130 









Hardware R&D + Software Modification 
$250,000.00 + $400,000.00 
$650,000.00 
PROCUREMENT COST 
(Units + Spares) x Unit Cost 
(130 + 28) xS55.500.00 
$8,769,000.00 
Ops./Maint. Cost = 
Discounted = 
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COST 
Hardware Mamt. Cost 
$1,265,418.72 
$458,646.00 
LCC TCO ARMOR = R&D + PROCUREMENT + OPS/MAINTENANCE 
$9,877,646.00 
*SDares = Number of spare units required to support the fleet for 1 00 operating hours 
•Service Life = Service life in years 
*MT3" = Mean Time Between Failure in hours 
^M7~^. = Mean Time To Reoair in hours 
* 
=
 ecair Cost = cixed hourly rate for maintenance cost 
•Software Maintenance = Cost to maintain ana upgrade software over the service life of the system 
Figure 4.  Life Cycle Cost Estimate for the TCO Armor 
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C.  MACCK LIFE CYCLE COST 
1. Research and Development Cost 
General Dynamics has funded the research and development 
effort for the MACCK through contractual agreements with the 
Army and self-investment. From the Marine Corps point of 
view, these are sunk costs. As such, they are not considered 
in this life cycle cost comparison. 
2. Procurement Cost 
Procurement costs for the MACCK are computed in the same 
manner as for the TCO Armor. The same method of determining 
the number of spares required for fleet support that was used 
for the TCO Armor indicated a quantity of 18 MACCK system 
spares would be required for a 90 percent operational 
availability rate. 
For the MACCK  K    = 130 
lambda= 0.001 
T    = 100 
P    =0.90 
The unit cost of $75,000 was provided by General Dynamics 
representatives (Hill, 1994) . 
Procurement Cost = (130 + 18) X $75,000 
The procurement cost for the MACCK is $11,100,000. 
3. Operations and Maintenance Cost 
The operations and maintenance cost for the MACCK was 
also computed in the same manner as for the TCO Armor. A MTBF 
of 1000 hours and MTTR of .5 hours for the MACCK was provided 
by General Dynamics representatives. These figures were based 
upon prior experience with similar equipment that was tested 
in simulated combat conditions. 
As discussed above, software maintenance costs for the 
MACCK will not be considered in this life cycle cost estimate. 
The discounted operations and maintenance cost for the 
MACCK is $139,658. 
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Figure 5 provides a numerical summary of the life cycle 




.j Units 130 R&D COST 
'! Unit Cost $75,000.00 0 
;i Spares 18 
'Service Life 15 
;IMTBF 1000 PROCUREMENT COST 
MTTR 0.5 Proc. Cost = (Units + Spares) x Unit Cost 
Reoair Cost $100.00 = (130 + 18) X $75,000.00 
Hours/Unit/Year 3952 = $11,100,000.00 
Total Op Hours 513760 
Discount Rate 7.00% 
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COST 
Ops./Maint. Cost = Hardware Maint. Cost 
= $385,320.00 
Discounted           = $139,658.00 
LCC MACCK = R&D + PROCUREMENT + OPS/MAINTENANCE 
$11,239,658.00 
•Spares = Number of spare units required to support the fleet for 1 00 operating hours 
»Service Life = Service life in years 
■*MTBF = Mean Time Between Failure in hours 
»MTTR = Mean Time To Repair in hours 
»Repair Cost = Fixed hourly rate for maintenance cost 
»Software Maintenance = Cost to maintain and upgrade software over the service life of the system 
Figure 5.  Life Cycle Cost Estimate for the MACCK 
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VII.  SYSTEMS COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  REQUIREMENTS COMPARISON 
The initial objectives of this study were to justify the 
need for the Marine Corps to provide a digital command and 
control capability at the individual platform level and to 
determine which of the systems analyzed in this thesis could 
meet a given set of requirements in the more cost effective 
manner. As the research on the second objective progressed, 
it became clear that neither system, as currently configured 
or envisioned, could fully meet all of the requirements set 
forth. Therefore, the focus of the study shifted to 
determining which system could best meet the given 
requirements in a reliable and cost effective manner. 
A system comparison requirements matrix (see Figure 6) 
was developed to more easily judge the merits of each system. 
Requirements are listed in the left column of the table with 
the following two columns indicating whether or not each 
system was able to meet them. The final column identifies the 
system that best meets the requirement. 
In keeping with the approach of focusing on key 
differences of the systems, the requirements that are not 
equally met by each system will be briefly discussed. 
1.  Situational Awareness 
Although both systems meet the situational awareness 
requirements put forth, the MACCK is deemed superior in this 
category. The rationale for this choice lies in the superior 
navigational system possessed by the MACCK. The onboard 
mertial navigation system makes reliance on a GPS or PLRS 
unnecessary. Although the MACCK uses GPS to update its 
mertial system, the system is not dependent upon an 
essentially external source for positional and navigational 
information. The redundancy of an onboard inertial 










Command and Control X X Equal 
Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support X X Equal 
Free Flow of Information 
— — 
Equal 
Non-Interfering Voice and 
Data Transmissions X X Equal 
No Mobility Degradation X X Equal 
"User Friendly" Software X X MACCK 
Reduce Electronic Counter- 
measure Susceptibility X MACCK 
Consider Information 
Security X X Equal 
Interoperability Priority X 
— 
TCO 
Remote Display X 
— 
TCO 
(X) = Meets requirement 
(-) = Does not meet the requirement 
TCO = TCO Armor best meets the requirement 
MACCK = MACCK best meets the requirement 
Equal = Neither system dominates the other in the requirement 
Figure 6.  Requirements Matrix 
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of reliability and makes it a superior system in providing 
situational awareness. 
2. Communication Management 
The fact that the TCO Armor does not meet all 
communication management requirements while the MACCK does 
obviously makes the MACCK the superior system in this 
category. The TCO Armor does not dynamically monitor all 
networks of which it is a part to create a listing of active 
users, nor does it provide the ability to furnish 
acknowledgment of the receipt of messages. Further, the TCO 
Armor will give the user a message relating the amount of disk 
capacity that is left rather than the number of unread 
messages which are in the queue. These deficiencies give the 
MACCK the edge in communication management. 
3. Command and Control 
An exception to discussing only those requirements where 
one system shows a distinct advantage is made for this 
category. Although the TCO Armor possesses certain features 
which are superior in this category, the functionality at the 
individual platform level is greater with the MACCK. The TCO 
Armor provides excellent data correlation and filtration 
capabilities, as well as the ability to easily disseminate 
messages and graphics with the use of convenient autoforward 
tables. However, these capabilities are most useful at 
echelons above the platform and platoon level. 
The MACCK gives the user a very reliable far target 
designation capability by utilizing the weapon platform's 
onboard laser rangefinder to interface with the command and 
control electronics unit. The MACCK allows for a more 
efficient total weapon system by reducing the number of 
-working parts the crew must deal with to obtain a _ given 
result. This makes for a better system when analyzed from a 
human factors viewpoint. 
Because both systems possess features superior to the 
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other in this category, they are given an equal ranking. 
4. "User Friendly" Software 
Software for the TCO Armor will be derived from the 
existing TCO software. This software is designed to provide 
capabilities needed at echelons far above battalion. The 
MACCK's software, on the other hand, was created specifically 
for users at the battalion and below level. This provides 
MACCK users a more tailored software package than will exist 
for the TCO Armor. 
5. Reduce Electronic Counter-Measure Susceptibility- 
while the TCO Armor is neither radiation hardened nor 
provided a significant degree of emissions shielding, the 
MACCK, as a militarized system, is protected against 
electronic counter-measures to a degree equal to other 
components in the M1A1 tank. 
6. Interoperability Priority 
This category, in the near term, is perhaps the most 
important to decision makers who must choose between available 
communication systems. The advantage is given to the TCO 
Armor because it is a system designed for the Marine Corps and 
derived from a system that is in very strong contention for 
procurement by the Marine Corps. The MACCK has been designed 
for the Army to be compatible with existing Army communication 
systems. At this time, these systems are not fully compatible 
with Marine Corps systems. 
7. Remote Display 
The TCO Armor proves superior in this category because 
its design calls for a detachable display panel which could be 
moved throughout the weapon platform. This is not the case 
for the MACCK, which uses a fixed tactical display unit. 
8. Cost 
While not in the requirements matrix, cost is a primary 
consideration when making a systems comparison. Life Cycle 
Cost, focusing only on major cost differences between the 
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systems, was used as the measurement for the cost of each 
system. As presented in Chapter 6, the life cycle cost 
estimate for the TCO Armor was $9,877,646, while the life 
cycle cost estimate for the MACCK was $11,239,658. The two 
estimates produce a difference of $1,362,012. This amount, 
although significant, reflects a relatively small difference 
in the total cost of the systems over their service life. 
Because these cost estimates focus only on major cost 
differences between the systems, their amounts fall well short 
of the actual life cycle costs that would be incurred by the 
systems. 
B.  SYSTEMS COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATION 
Given the similar costs of the two systems, and the fact 
that neither meets all of the requirements set forth in 
Chapter 4, the degree of functionality provided by each system 
and key external factors must be considered in making a choice 
between the alternatives. 
The overall functionality advantage goes to the MACCK. 
In dominating more of the requirements than the TCO Armor, the 
MACCK is ehe rational choice as the superior system. Making 
in even more appealing is the fact that it, unlike the TCO 
Armor, is designed to militarized standards and is based on 
equipment fully tested in a simulated combat environment. One 
of the TCO Armor's most significant shortcomings is its lack 
of solid testing in a field environment. The estimates of 
reliability factors are for the most part based on components 
tested in a static environment. The risk associated with the 
procurement of the TCO Armor will remain high until it has 
been fully tested in a rigorous combat-like environment. 
However, in the near term, the risks involved with 
pursuing the TCO Armor concept are overshadowed by the MACCK's 
inability to interface with Marine Corps command, control, and 
communication systems.   The superior functionality of the 
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MACCK is wasted on a weapon platform that cannot interface 
with its higher echelon. Instead of creating synchronization 
and unity of effort, the MACCK will serve to isolate the 
Marine Corps vehicle on which it is a part. Until the 
Department of Defense forces the services to adopt common 
standards and protocols so that the flow of information on the 
battlefield can proceed in a seamless manner, intra-service 
compatibility requirements will dominate functionality 
questions. 
Therefore, the conclusion of this study is that unless 
the MACCK can be made to be compatible with existing Marine 
Corps command, control, and communication systems, the TCO 
Armor should be the system more vigorously pursued for 
procurement. 
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